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Islam and politics: 
the case of Bulgaria
Scholarly interest in the Muslim peoples in Europe is growing.1 Th e de-
bate continues on whether Muslims should be granted special privileges 
in European countries due to their faith while their national identity and 
culture are depreciated, or whether followers of Islam should be allowed 
to live according to their own rules and that society at large should accept 
it in accordance with the Western principle of tolerance. And if so, what 
would be the consequences of this?
Th is article presents the status and history of Muslims in Bulgaria after 
the Second World War and the policy of the Bulgarian state after it joined 
the European Union.2 It examines a post-communist state which is adjust-
ing its legal norms to European standards. 
While the predominant religion in Bulgaria is that of the Orthodox 
Church, there is a small Catholic population and also national minorities 
who are Muslims: Turks, Roma, Pomaks, and Tartars who settled in Bul-
garia after a few centuries of the Ottoman Empire. Turks mainly inhabit 
the southern parts of the country close to the Turkish border (Eastern 
Rhodopy, Stranga, where – in the region of Kardzhali – they are in the 
majority) and north-east Ludogoria, southern Dobrich, Silistra, Shumen, 
Razgrad. Some Turks also live in the bigger cities such as Soﬁ a, Varna, and 
Ruse.
* Prof. dr hab., Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego.
1  In Polish literature the most well known work is A. Parzymies (ed.), Muzułmanie 
w Europie, Warszawa 2005. See also: M. Żmigrodzki, Przeobrażenia polityczno-
-ustrojowe i Sąd Konstytucyjny w Bułgarii, Lublin 1997, pp. 86–113; E. Znamie-
rowska-Rakk, Sprawa przesiedlenia obywateli bułgarskich tureckiego pochodzenia 
do Turcji po drugiej wojnie światowej, in: Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich. 
Materiały i dokumenty, Warszawa 1977, Vol. XV; J. Byczkowski, Mniejszości naro-
dowe w Europie 1945–1974, Opole 1976. 
2 Szersze ujęcie zagadnienia przedstawione zostało w monograﬁ i: S. Kiselinovski, 
I. Stavovi-Kavka (I. Stawowy-Kawka), Malcinstva na Balkanot (XX vek), Skopje 
2004. 
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Th e Turkish population at the beginning of the 20th century comprised 
9.7% of Bulgaria’s inhabitants. It has not changed much since then, despite 
waves of migration to Turkey. In 1946 there were 675,500Turks in Bul-
garia (9.6 % of the population), in 1956 there were 656,025, in 1965 there 
were 780,928, in 1975 there were 730,728, and in 1992 there were 800,052 
(9.4%).3
Some legislative acts that dealt with Muslims’ rights were passed 
at the turn of the 20th century. Under the Congress of Berlin (1878) 
Bulgaria had to grant national minorities religious freedom and equal-
ity. After Bulgaria regained its sovereignty this policy was followed by 
a protocol with Turkey signed in April 1909 by which Soﬁ a commit-
ted itself to guaranteeing religious freedom to minorities and to treating 
national minorities on an equal basis with Bulgarians. Th e 1913 con-
vention on muftis that contained regulations concerning the religious 
administration of the Muslim minority is to a large extent still applied 
today. Th e Mufti, who acts as head of the Church and is elected by his 
followers, needs to acquire the permission of the Bulgarian government 
before his appointment. Similar regulations were applied after the Bal-
kan wars on 20 August 1913 and also included in the Treaty of Neuilly 
and Lausanne.
Turkey was particularly interested in guaranteeing Muslims’ rights in 
Bulgaria. In 19254 it signed a convention which caused the mass migra-
tion of Turks and Pomaks in the years 1927, 1933, and 1935.5 Th e treaty of 
friendship between Bulgaria and Turkey that was signed in October 1925 
secured assistance and protection for Turks living in Bulgaria. It has not 
always been proﬁ table, since a bigger inﬂ uence on the Turkish minority 
was exerted by Kemal’s state, not only in religious matters but also in ad-
ministrative and legal ones. 
While analyzing the situation of the status and the rights of the Mus-
lim minority in Bulgaria after the Second World War, we usually present 
several reasons for the Bulgarian authorities’ policy. Bulgarian researchers 
most often emphasise the following facts:
1. Islam was an alien religion, imposed on Bulgarians by force; 
3 Nacionalen statistički institut, Prebrojavane na naselenieto, rziliszcznija fond i ze-
medelskite stopanstva prez 2001, Izvadkovi izsledvanija, Soﬁ ja 2002, Vol. 6, kniga 1, 
s. 55, 56.
4 Th is was a consequence of the treaty of friendship signed between the two coun-
tries in October 1925. See M. Żmigrodzki, Mniejszości narodowe…, op. cit., p. 99. 
5 Muzułmanie w Europie…, op. cit., s. 58.
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2. Before Bulgaria regained independence6 in 1878, Islam played a negati-
ve role, hindering the development of Bulgarian culture for centuries;
3. Since Bulgaria’s independence foreign, reactionary factors from outsi-
de (that is, from Turkey) used Islam in Bulgaria to promote nationalism 
and religious fanaticism among Muslims in the country;
4. Islam was an obstacle in the process of integrating the Muslims and 
Bulgarians into one socialist nation.7 
According to the nationalist idea, a nation can thrive only within an in-
dependent state that comprises all its members. Th e term “Bulgaria” was 
used as a synonym of the Bulgarian nation or the state’s territory. Th e con-
tinuation of the historic tradition that goes back to medieval times when 
Bulgaria achieved its highest growth was used as an argument to support 
the creation of natural borders of the Bulgarian national state. Th e deci-
sion of the San Stefano treaty that ended the Russo-Turkish war (3 March 
1878) and the fact that the borders of “Greater Bulgaria” had been erased 
created a feeling of great injustice among the Bulgarians. Th is feeling of 
discontent can be noticed within the works of historians and political sci-
entists. Th is defensive nationalism based on “an attitude like martyrdom 
that this nation expressed, isolated and that failed to gain the attention 
of the world”,8 was a characteristic feature of the whole post-war period. 
And, as Todorova says, “a large number of texts that were published fo-
cused on the problem of a national ideal for which national romanticism 
was a central point… that looked for a correlation between the nation and 
the territory; in other words, between the nation and the state”.9 
Shortly after the Second World War, atheistic education and anti-Is-
lamic propaganda were implemented; at the same time, the authorities 
tried to gain inﬂ uence in that community, using coercion when necessary. 
Th e potential world of Islam was to be replaced by a scientiﬁ c-atheistic 
model. It was assumed that such a scenario could be pursued with the 
help of young intellectuals who were sometimes lost among the Muslim 
people, and who were supposed to play a historic role in replacing the 
“superstitions” of the old Muslim ideologists with the scientiﬁ c ideology 
6 Formally Bulgaria regained independence in 1908. A Bulgarian Principality de-
pendent on Turkey was created. Th e southern part of the country, Eastern Rume-
lia, became an autonomous province within the Ottoman state.
7 Petya Nitzova, Islam in Bulgaria: a historical reappraisal, “Religion, State and So-
ciety” 1994, No. 1, Vol. 22, p. 101.
8 Maria Todorova, Language in the Construction of Ethnicity and Nationalism: Th e 
Case of Bulgaria, Berkeley, University of California, Center for German and Euro-
pean Studies, Working Paper 5.5, p. 28.
9 Ibidem.
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of Marxism-Leninism – the ideology of the Communist Party.10 At the 
same time it was emphasized that Turkish national aspirations had to be 
condemned. 
Th is new situation led to the emigration of Muslims, mainly to Turkey, 
which was typical of the post-war period. Fear of new political changes11 
led to many Turks deciding to move in order to avoid repression and to im-
prove their situation. Th e emigration movement increased in 1950, when 
as many as 250,000 people wanted to leave the country. Ankara ended 
the mass migration and admitted very few people. Soﬁ a accused Turkey 
of racism and corruption when it came to deciding who should be grant-
ed asylum. Th e press reported that there were thousands of emigrants 
waiting at the border. In 1950 the number of expelled Turks was 55,746. 
Ankara, on the other hand, accused Soﬁ a of sending agents and Roma 
with the Turks. An agreement was reached in December 1950. Emigrating 
Turks could keep their property and leave the country using an exit visa. 
Misunderstandings regarding these issues were, however, still common 
in the following years. Th e state border was closed and then reopened 
again. In the years 1950 and 1951 alone, 150,000 Muslims12 left Bulgaria 
for Turkey.
Th e Bulgarian policy towards the migrants was not stable. In 1948 and 
1949 the authorities tried to stop the mass emigration. From July 1949 the 
Political Bureau of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) decided not to 
end the emigration and force the Bulgarians to settle on the territories left 
by Turks. As early as April 1951, however, a “multination state” became 
the predominant policy and new attempts were made to reduce migration. 
Th is situation lasted until 1956. Th e 1947 constitution which was then in 
force guaranteed all national minorities basic rights and freedoms. It was 
modelled on the Soviet constitution and it enacted the rules of the USSR 
policy towards national minorities. Besides the constitutional regulations, 
Bulgaria was obliged to follow the terms of the peace treaty of 10 Feb-
ruary 1947 regarding the protection of minorities’ rights on its territory, 
which included basic rights and freedoms of citizens no matter what their 
race, language or religion was. Bulgaria also signed the 1948 UN Gen-
10 Ali Eminov, Turkish and other Muslim Minorites in Bulgaria, London 1997, p. 53.
11 Evgenija Kalinova and Iska Baeva, in: Bylgarskite prehodi 1939–2002, Soﬁ ja 2002, 
p. 113, emphasize that “Deep socio-economic changes frightened the conserva-
tively minded masses, which viewed with disbelief the alien propaganda about 
cooperation in agriculture, equality between men and women, atheism and the 
abandonment of ‘religious fanaticism’ through the ban on reading the Koran”. 
12 Th ese data compare with those cited by Ali Eminov’a, Turkish…, op. cit., p. 79.
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eral Declaration of Human Rights, which regulates the status of national 
minorities. 
At that time a chain of Turkish schools was developing in Bulgaria. In 
1952 there were 1020 primary schools with Turkish as their language of 
instruction, and by 1956 there were already 1149 schools and four Turk-
ish institutes. Th e Faculty of Oriental Languages at the University of St. 
Kliment Ochridski in Soﬁ a taught Turkish to provide teachers for these 
schools. Th ere were Turkish libraries, reading rooms, folk groups; Turks 
had their own theatres, newspapers and magazines, such as New Life, New 
Light, National Youth, Th e Flag of Communism, Fatherland, Light, Friend-
ship, Little Villager, Pioneer and others.13
Party ideologists believed that the class interests of workers would over-
come their national identity and that they would willingly become Bulgar-
ian socialists. Th is did not happen. Encouraged to develop their own cul-
tural institutions, even in a socialist context, national minorities managed 
to strengthen, not weaken, their national identity. Th e problem became 
visible in the mid-1950s. Th e number of Turks was increasing rather than 
decreasing for Pomaks, Roma, Tartars (followers of Islam) who regarded 
themselves as being Turks. Th e authorities realized that a radical change 
in policy was necessary in order to make Bulgaria a one-nation state. 
After 1956 the rights of national minorities became increasingly lim-
ited. In October 1958 the Central Cmmittee of the BCP accepted a plan 
that involved not only intensiﬁ ed ideological work among the Muslim 
population, but also some changes in the oﬃ  cial policy towards the Turk-
ish minority. In the 1958/59 academic year a rule was applied that the 
language of instruction in all secondary schools had to be solely Bulgar-
ian. Th is decision was put into practice in the period 1960–1972, when 
all schools taught only in the Bulgarian language. Th e publishing of both 
newspapers and books in Turkish was limited, and in 1960 the Turkish mi-
nority was called “Turkish-language Bulgarians”14 After 1958 Turks were 
regarded not only as “diﬀ erent” but also as “dangerous”, for the oﬃ  cial 
propaganda claimed that they wanted the land they inhabited to become 
part of Turkey. 
In 1962 the government took steps to prevent the “Turkishisation” of 
Roma, Pomaks and Tartars. A document was prepared entitled Putting 
13 S. Kiselinovski, I. Stavovi-Kavka (I. Stawowy-Kawka), Malcinstva…, op. cit., p. 145, 
146.
14 S. Kiselinovski, Mniejszości narodowe w Bułgarii, in: “Prace Komisji Środkowo-
europejskiej PAU”, J. Machnik, I. Stawowy-Kawka (eds.), Kraków 2005, Vol. XIII, 
p. 114, 115.
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into practice measures against the Turkish identiﬁ cation of Roma, Pomaks 
and Tartars,15 which presented the methods that would help to eliminate 
the Turks’ inﬂ uence over these groups. Public pressure was recommend-
ed, rather than the use of force. In practice it looked rather diﬀ erent. From 
1962 the process of translating names and surnames into Bulgarian among 
these communities began. Despite the fact that the Politburo of the BCP 
condemned the use of coercion when implementing this policy, during 
the period 1971–1973 all Pomaks and Roma were forced to change their 
names. Th is action found was conﬁ rmed in the new constitution of 1971, 
which did not mention national minorities. After 1971 the only term used 
was “Bulgarian citizens (of non-Bulgarian origin)” instead of such terms 
as “national” or “ethnic minority”. Th e application of a new constitution 
meant that the government and party leaders undertook the task of build-
ing a nation state with one language, culture and tradition. Th e concept 
of a “united socialist nation” appeared in newspapers and the media, and 
Todor Zhivkov himself declared that the national problem was deﬁ nitely 
solved by society itself and that Bulgaria had no internal conﬂ icts that 
were derived from national minorities. However, these were only declara-
tions.
Th e emigration of Bulgarian Muslims increased at that time; this was 
facilitated by Todor Zhivkov’s visit to Ankara and the agreement that was 
reached on 22 March 1968 concerning the relocation of Turks from Bul-
garia. In the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s a rise in Muslim fun-
damentalism could be observed in Bulgaria as in other parts of the world, 
facilitated by contacts with Turkey and the Islamic world. Nationalist-reli-
gious excitement and hostility towards others were especially visible in the 
country, where Turks possessed ﬁ nancial resources from some ambiguous 
source that were to be spent mainly on religious activity. Th e authorities in 
Soﬁ a responded harshly to this situation. Religious practice had a private 
character. In spite of actions against religion the state retained about 1400 
mosques as well as imams and muezzins. Muslims were led by the great 
Mufti and twenty-six local muftis.16 One of the most important commit-
ments of Soﬁ a regarding policy towards minorities was the 1975 Helsinki 
Final Act and other agreements of the Helsinki Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe that imposed on the government signatories 
the obligation to respect fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of con-
sciousness, religion, speech and emigration.
15 Ali Eminov, op. cit., p. 7.
16 Muzułmanie w Europie…, op. cit., p. 61.
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By 1973 Pomaks, Roma and Tartars were forced to acquire Bulgarian 
identity. Th e Tartars resisted longer than the others; they went through 
the most diﬃ  cult period in 1984–1989, when Todor Zhivkov decided that 
the greatest problem that Bulgaria faced was with the Muslims (who rep-
resented 10% of the whole population). 25 December 1984 witnessed the 
beginning of the process of forced Bulgarization of the Muslim population, 
who were of mainly Turkish origin. It involved the changing of names and 
surnames into Bulgarian, a ban on religious practice, the use of Turkish 
and the cultivation of tradition. Th e authorities assumed that Turks would 
react to these practices in a similar way as the Roma and Pomaks, who had 
not vigorously opposed it,17 and they therefore undertook a policy of pro-
moting the Bulgarian “national revival”. In the end the use of the Turkish 
language in public life was banned; there was no Turkish broadcasting on 
the radio, Turkish newspapers and books were banned, and a prohibition 
was placed on Turkish being spoken in the street. Zhivkov explained this 
in the following way: “the annual birth-rate is about 15–16 thousand. If it 
stays like this in 20 years Bulgaria will turn into another Cyprus. We would 
welcome the emigration of 200–300,000, even 500,000, but you must un-
derstand that in practice we cannot allow this to happen. Turkey is not 
able to and will not admit these people. Th is is why a new approach is 
necessary… I want to, however, express clearly our position: by no means 
will we regard them as Turks.”18 According to Iskra Baeva, Mikhail Gor-
bachev participated in the mediation between the Turkish government of 
Turguta Özal and Todor Zhivkov. Özal agreed to admit 30,000 Bulgarian 
Turks every year.19
In response to the repressions, the Turks formed illegal organizations. 
Th e most well known was the Turkish National Liberation Movement in 
Bulgaria, led by a philosopher, Medim Doganov (Tur. Ahmed Dogan). In 
1990 its name was changed to the Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
– the DPS (Dvi`enie za prava i svobodi). In 1988 the Association for the 
Protection of Human Rights was created, whose main goal was the pro-
tection of Turks’ rights and freedoms. From 1984–1989 another 28 illegal 
organizations were discovered by the authorities. Turks also engaged in 
terrorist attacks, mainly on the railway line between Burgas and Soﬁ a and 
against railway stations, e.g. in Varna. Innocent people were killed, includ-
17 Pomaks used double names and surnames, diﬀ erent at home and diﬀ erent in the 
oﬃ  ce.
18 Iskra Baeva, Ostatni rok: Bułgaria i kraje bloku sowieckiego w 1989 roku, “Studia 
z dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 2009, Vol. XLIV, p. 209.
19 Ibidem, p. 209.
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ing children. As the daily Sega reported20, the repressions aﬀ ected about 
10,000 people. 
In 1989, when a conference on human rights was taking place in Paris, 
numerous demonstrations were organized in the country. Attempts were 
made to suppress them through the use of force, which resulted in casu-
alties and people being injured.21 On 29 May, in an address on national 
television, Todor Zhivkov requested that the Turkish government open its 
borders to their own compatriots, so that every Bulgarian Muslim could 
leave the country.22 Th e politics of forced assimilation and religious intol-
erance resulted in an exodus of the Turkish population. Within just two 
to three months 350,000 Bulgarian Turks moved to Turkey, and this mass 
migration was called “the great excursion”. Turks would sell their land be-
low the market price and emigrate. Th e relationship between Bulgaria and 
Ankara became increasingly diﬃ  cult.23. On 21 August 1989 Ankara closed 
Turkish borders, unable to cope with such a huge number of emigrants. 
About 150,000 people had to return to Bulgaria, and 200,000 stayed in 
Turkey permanently.24 Th e most visible result of the policy of forced Bul-
garization was a growing sense of national and religious separateness as 
well as a deep economic crisis, especially in agriculture. Th e government 
had to call on a “civil mobilization” in June 1989, which involved a twelve-
hour working day, mainly in agriculture. Despite these diﬃ  culties Soﬁ a 
did not change its oﬃ  cial position, that in Bulgaria there had never been 
and still was no Turkish national minority. Th e countries of the Eastern 
Bloc respected this statement, and the organization in Soﬁ a of the Eco-
logical Forum (15 October–3 November) were regarded as the greatest 
success of contemporary foreign policy. 
Th e situation of the Muslim minority improved after the collapse of the 
Zhivkov government. Gradually old names and surnames were restored, 
religious freedom was guaranteed, the Turkish language could be used in 
public and it returned to schools. 
20 Sega, 25 May 1999.
21 See E. Centkowska, Jesień ludów ’89. Kalendarium wydarzeń, Biuletyn Specjalny 
PAP of 23 May 1989, Warszawa 1992, p. 74.
22 Turgut Özal was ready to admit about 30,000 Turkish emigrants from Bulgaria ev-
ery year. Gorbachev participated in those negotiations, see I. Baeva, Ostatni rok…, 
op. cit., p. 209.
23 J. Baev, N. Kotev, Izselinczeskijat wypros w bylgarsko-turskite otnoszenija sled 
Wtorata swetowna wojna, in: „Meżdunarodni otnoszenija”, Soﬁ ja 1994, kn. 2, pp. 
50–61.
24 Darina Vasileva, Bulgarian Turkish emigration and return, “International Migra-
tion Review” 1992, Vol. 2, No. 26, p. 348. 
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Th ese positive changes did not improve relations between Turks and 
Bulgarians in the country. Among the Turks nationalism and religious 
fanaticism increased. In towns inhabited by Turks, Bulgarian ﬂ ags were 
taken down and burned and replaced with Turkish ones, monuments 
were built that commemorated the terrorists of the previous period, and 
slogans such as “Death to Christians”, “Allah is great”, and “Jihad” contin-
ued to spread. Th ese actions, as well as demands that all Christians should 
leave Rhodopy, or that purely Turkish ministries should be created,25 were 
opposed by Bulgarian society. Some intellectuals involved in promoting 
democratic political change demanded a referendum to prevent the ter-
ritories inhabited by Turks in Bulgaria being granted autonomy. Th e au-
thorities in Bulgaria tried to placate such sentiments and gave an assur-
ance that Bulgaria “would remain an independent country with Bulgarian 
as its oﬃ  cial language”.26
Th e situation improved gradually after a conference that addressed na-
tional issues was organized in Soﬁ a on 12 January 1990. As a result of the 
conference a document was released that was supposed to placate both 
the Bulgarian and Turkish sides. Th e document condemned the rescind-
ing of Muslim rights under Zhivkov’s regime, including the right to preach 
Islam and to practise the religion, the use of the Turkish language and 
their own names and surnames. Th e documents’ content was also sup-
posed to assuage Bulgarian nationalists’ concerns. It conﬁ rmed that the 
only oﬃ  cial language in the country was Bulgarian, and condemned the 
actions of separatist groups which demanded separation or autonomy for 
the territories inhabited by Turks.
Th e new constitution of Bulgaria in 1991 supported these pronounce-
ments. Th e second article (par. 1) stated: (1) Th e Republic of Bulgaria shall 
be a unitary state with self-government. No autonomous territorial forma-
tions shall be allowed to exist therein. (2) Th e territorial integrity of the Re-
public of Bulgaria shall be inviolable.27 Of great importance for the politi-
cal existence of minorities was article 11 par. 4 of the Constitution, which 
stated: Th ere shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious lines, 
nor parties which seek the violent seizure of state power. It limits the rights 
of minorities to the establishment of political organizations and contra-
dicts article 6 of the same Constitution, which proclaims the principle of 
non-discrimination.28 
25 S. Kiselinivski, Mniejszości narodowe…, op. cit., p. 117.
26 M. Żmigrodzki, Mniejszość turecka…, op. cit., p. 109.
27 Konstitucija na Republika Bylgarija Obh., DW, br. 56 ot 13 juli 1991, Soﬁ ja 1997, 
p. 5.
28 Ibidem, p. 6. 
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Such a statement in the Constitution resulted in the municipal court in 
Soﬁ a on 28 August 1991 denying the registration of the movement led by 
Dogan as a political party. Over 90% of all members of the DPS and its vot-
ers were ethnic Turks.29 Th e decision was upheld by the Highest Court on 
11 September 1991, even through the Central Voting Commission had al-
lowed the DPS to stand for election because the DPS had been registered 
in the spring of 1990, before the new constitution had been proclaimed. 
Th us Bulgarian nationalists failed to eliminate the party from the Bulgar-
ian political scene.30
Bulgaria committed itself to the requirements included in the Frame-
work Convention on the Protection of Minorities of 1 February 1995. Th e 
interpretation of the principles of the convention was quite remarkable, 
since the Bulgarian parliament on 5 March 1990 issued a declaration 
stating that Bulgaria was a unitary state in respect to nationality and 
therefore had no obligations of that kind. Th e Parliamentary declara-
tion stated: Bulgaria is committed to the politics of toleration and the 
protection of human rights of the people who belong to minorities and is 
responsible for their integration into Bulgarian society.31 But, as B. Najgu-
lov has noted, the legislators had in mind language, religious and ethnic 
minorities and not national minorities (there is no deﬁ nition of such in 
international law).32
Articles 6, 29, 36 and 37 include a catalogue of minority rights. Art. 36 
par. 2 says that Citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian shall have 
the right to study and use their own language alongside the compulsory 
study of the Bulgarian language.33 Art. 13 formulates such principles as 
the unrestricted practising of religion and separation of religious institu-
tions from the state, and emphasizes that religious institutions and com-
munities, and religious beliefs should not be used for political purposes.
In Bulgaria, freedom to worship is respected, and the state does not 
interfere in religious publishing. In 1994 the Chief Oﬃ  ce of the Mufti 
was reestablished as well as the postgraduate Islamic Institute, and four 
new religious schools were opened in Shumen, Ruse, Momchilgrad and 
29 Th e remaining 10% consists of the Muslims’ electorate – Pomaks and some 
Roma.
30 See Jerzy Jackowicz, Bułgaria od rządów komunistycznych do demokracji parla-
mentarnej 1988–1991, Warszawa 1992, pp. 72, 73.
31 B. Najgulov, Ewropejskata zasztita na malcinstwa i Byłgarija – sywremenni aspek-
ti, “Istoriczeski Pregled”, 5–6/2000, pp. 293, 294.
32 Ibidem.
33 Ibidem, p. 11.
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Glodzhevo. Eight new mosques were opened and applications for forty 
new ones were submitted. In total, there were 920 mosques in Bulgaria in 
1992.
Th e Turkish press and magazines, such as Rights and Freedoms, Hope, 
Trust, Flag and others, are now permitted to be published. Since 2003 
a Turkish newspaper, New Life, has been published in Kardjali. Radio and 
television broadcasting in Turkish is also available. Th e democratization 
and liberalization of life, active contacts with compatriots in Turkey, but 
also with the Arab world strengthened the role of Islamic organizations 
and foundations in the 1990s. Th e deputy governor of the Pazardhik, 
Radgeb Malaahmed, publicly appealed to the authorities to repatriate 
Christian Roma from this territory. Th at forced the authorities to pro-
hibit some of the actions of Muslim organizations in order to stop the 
spread of Turkish nationalism and religious fanaticism. Each year, how-
ever, young people would go abroad for training, which caused some 
concern. Bulgarians for their part established anti-Turkish committees 
and organizations under the slogan “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians”. Th is 
is how the Nationwide Committee to Protect National Interests – the 
OKNI (Op{tonarodniot komitet za za{tita na nacionalnite interesi), the 
Nationwide Labour Party (Ote~estvenata parti® na trud, OPT) were es-
tablished. Th e biggest surprise was the appearance of the political party 
Ataka, led by Volen Siderov, just before the 2005 parliamentary elec-
tion.34 It won as much as 8.93% of the vote (that is, 21 seats), despite the 
fact that it was established just two months earlier. It was not oﬃ  cially 
registered in court before the election, and together with a few smaller 
parties it created the ATAKA Coalition. Its programme proclaimed Bul-
garia to be a one-nation and one-ethnic country, and postulated that the 
rights of other nations, especially the right to use their own language 
and preach their own religion, should be limited. In the 2009 election 
the party again won 21 seats. 
Many Turks decided to emigrate because of the diﬃ  cult economic situ-
ation. In 1992 alone 70,000 Turks left Bulgaria. Altogether, over 1,100,000 
Turks have left Bulgaria since the beginning of the post-communist trans-
formation. 
34 Th e ATAKA coalition was formed by nationalist parities: the National Move-
ment for the Salvation of the Fatherland, (Nacionalno dvi`enie za spasenie na 
Ote~estvoto), the Bulgarian National Patriotic Party (BÍlgarska nacionalno-
patrioti~na partia), Ataka (Ataka), New Dawn (Nova Zora), Union of Patriotic 
Forces “Defence” (SÍ¥z na patrioti~nite sili „ ZaÈita”). 
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Table 1: Migration of Turks from Bulgaria since 1878
1912–1912 350 000
1933–1933 101 507
1939–1939 97 181
1949–1949 21 353
1951–1951 154 198
1968–1968 24
1978–1978 114 356
1988–1988 0
1992–1992 321 800
Total: 1160 614
Source: Ali Eminov, Turkish…, op. cit., p. 79.
Muslims participate widely in the political life of Bulgaria. Th e party 
of Ahmed Dogan Movement for Rights and Freedoms (the DPS with its 
slogan “Bulgaria for all”) had a decisive breakthrough in the elections and 
gained 5–7% support of the electorate, winning seats in parliament. Since 
2001 it has been the only party which has played the role of a coalition 
maker, ﬁ rst in the National Movement of Simeon II, and after the 2005 
election entering government with the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Dogan’s 
party won 38 seats in the 240-seat parliament in the last election on 5 July 
2009. Th e party of Boyko Borisov, Citizens for the European Development 
of Bulgaria, in the 2009 parliamentary election won a large enough major-
ity to allow it to create a one-party government.
Th e changing policy towards the Muslim community in Bulgaria was 
carefully examined by the European Commission before Bulgaria was 
permitted to join the European Union, and a Commission report was 
published annually. In the report of 15 July 1997 it was emphasised that 
“it seems that the Turkish minority is well integrated with the rest of the 
population.”35 It also stated that this integration is facilitated by a large 
number of Turkish representatives in the elected assemblies (15 MPs, 
25 councillors, over 1000 representatives in local self-government). Th e 
Commission, however, still highlighted a number of problems that need-
ed to be resolved: the lack of Turkish representatives at the higher levels 
of public administration and in the army, the high unemployment rate 
35 Commission Opinion on Bulgaria’s Application for Membership of the European 
Union, DOC 97/11, 15 July 1997, http://ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/documents/abc/bu-
op-1997_en.pdf, p. 119, accessed 15.09.2009
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among the Turkish population, and the low standards of teaching in Turk-
ish schools.36 After 2001 the Commission’s assessment was even more 
positive. In its 2002 report it stated that Th e Turkish minority is integrated 
into political life through elected representation at national and local lev-
els and increasing representation in public administration.37 Th is positive 
assessment was possible due to Bulgaria’s decision to allow the Turkish 
party DPS to stand for elections in 2001 and eﬀ ectively to join the govern-
ing coalition.
Furthermore, in the 2004 Regular Report the European Commission 
positively assessed the national policy towards the Turkish minority, 
stating: Th e Turkish minority continues to be integrated into political life 
through elected representation at national and local levels. Further at-
tention needs to be paid to the socio-economic integration of those ethnic 
Turks and other minority groups who live in economically less developed 
regions.38
Th e Report of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights39 provides very 
interesting data and shows that while in Denmark as many as 42% of 
Turks have suﬀ ered discrimination, in Bulgaria the ﬁ gure is only 9% and 
in Austria 10%. In Bulgaria, Luxemburg and Austria the majority of Mus-
lim respondents said that they were not discriminated against because 
of their religion, while respondents from Italy, Belgium and France claim 
that they suﬀ er from religious discrimination. Moreover, when moving 
through border and custom controls, Turks from Bulgaria do not ﬁ nd 
themselves being treated any worse than other citizens. Th e situation is 
diﬀ erent when it comes to Muslims who are citizens of other countries. 
Th is can be explained by the fact that Muslims from Bulgaria are Bulgar-
ian citizens; they have inhabited the country for centuries, while Muslims 
from other countries are immigrants. It was noted in the report that the 
Muslim population inhabits mainly rural areas, which are less developed 
economically, and that its relations with Bulgarians were virtually non-
existent. 
36 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria, Progress towards Acces-
sion, 8 November 2000, http://ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/documents/abc/rr-bg-2000_
en.pdf, p. 22, accessed 15.09.2009
37 2002 Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress towards Accession, 9.10.2002, http://
ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/documents/abc/rr-bg-2002_en.pdf, p. 33, accessed 15.09. 2009
38 2004 Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress towards Accession, http:// ec.europa.
eu/Bulgaria/documents/abc/rr/bg-2004_en.pdf. p. 28.
39 2009 Report of European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), www.fra.
europa.eu, p. 110, accessed 15.09. 2009. 
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In spite of the positive assessment of the European Commission, Turk-
ish people are not happy with their status in Bulgaria. Similar to the events 
of 1991, when the debate over the new Bulgarian constitution was taking 
place and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms argued that the con-
stitution should state that Turkish along with Bulgarian is also the oﬃ  cial 
language in the country, on 24 July 2009 Turkish parliamentarians spoke 
in the parliament only in their own language (which is against the law); 
this served as a reminder of their earlier demands. Th e intensity of such 
demands could increase, the more so after the Muslim minority in Bul-
garia lost its potential for forming coalition governments. Th e question 
of the extent of the rights of Muslims and what the consequences of their 
implementation would be is therefore still very important. 
